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RETAILERS' BUYING:
The purpose of the next two chapters is to select from
the infinite number of goals, problems, attitudes, insti-
tutions, and management devices that constitute a re-
tail shoe store those that bear most critically on the
temporal pattern of the purchase of its stock in trade.
Chapter 10 brings together the results of the study of
time series just reviewed and of the practices in retail
stores that are the subject of this and the following
chapter. The discussion proceeds in several steps
which it may be useful to disclose at the outset.
In determining what to buy, a retailer must decide
not only how much and what he thinks he will sell but
also the size of stocks from which customers' selections
can profitably be made. We tackle the second prob-
lem first and study the role that stocks play in a retail
shoe store; we learn that their function is central, and
that to discharge it, a fairly precise and strongly en-
forced stock plan is required. This matter of the clarity
and firmness of the objective is critical, especially in
determining the timing relations between turns in sales
and orders. We then study what the actual stock ob-
jective seems to be—Does it fix upon an absolute
quantity, or a given average or incremental relation to
sales? (We postpone studying what part "speculative"
considerations play.) Next, we consider what condi-
tions circumscribe the ability to achieve the objectives.
At this point the problems of buying for sales and for
desired change in stocks merge into one, and we study
typical ordering procedure. In view of the fact that
retailers have to place at least a substantial part of
their orders before they know what sales will be, errors
are bound to occur and we arrive at a notion of what
the general pattern of the error tends to be. From
this follows the pattern of the unintended change in
stock in which the error immediately results.
Because objectives with respect to stock are fairly
clearly defined and firmly held, the error is likely to
be corrected. In the character of these corrections we
find a clue to the lead that seems to be present in
orders. When corrective orders are combined with
other orders (in what seem like reasonable propor-
tions) to depict total orders under the assumption of
stable conditions in the supplying market, we also find
that the analysis has provided a clue to the greater
subcycical amplitude of earlier stages relative to retail
sales.
GENERAL ANALYSIS
In the next chapter we develop another clue to both
the earlier turns in orders and the greater
amplitude of fluctuations. It concerns shifts in buyers'
evaluations of future prices and of the ease speed
and certainty of procurement. These shifts in
prospects" seem to be associated with changes in the
amount of goods that merchants choose to have both
in stock and on order.
Stock in a Retail Shoe Store
Central to the successful management of any retail
store, and especially of a retail shoe store, is a stock
composed of the proper selection of merchandise in
quantities that are neither too large nor too small. With
respect to the selection of the right merchandise, there
is little that I can say except that it is probably the
subject of most critical concern to the businessman.
Likewise of great concern to the retailer is the posses-
sion of a quantity of goods sufficient to attract and sat-
isfy customers, but not so large as to require excessive
working capital or to incur unnecessary loss through
deterioration and obsolescence. lIt is this quantitative
decision that is central to the problem we
IMPORTANCE OF STOCK CONTROL
To have enough shoes in stock, a retailer must first
suit the purse of his customers. The price range he must
carry is narrowed by the fact that a store is known as
carrying "popular," "medium," or "quality" goods; ac-
cordingly, certain people exclude themselves auto-
matically as potential customers, Within the chosen
segment a store must stock a number of prices. The
institution of price lining (discussed briefly in Chapter
5) simplifies the merchandising problem somewhat; it
means that selections of shoes will be offered at each
of a number of prices separated from one another by
palpable intervals: historical figures over the period we
study are $2.98, $3.98, $4.50, $6.50, $8.50, But the
problem of suiting the purse remains complex.
The authors of "Establishing and Operating a Retail Shoe
Business" (Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Do-
mestic Commerce, Industrial [Small Businessi Series 34, 1946,
p. 83) advise that the most successful small stores confine
their merchandise to a narrow range of prices. Conservative
shoes bought for wear ought to be offered at a higher price
than style shoes. Pairs of prices suggested are style shoes at96 CHAPTER 8
Next, a retailer must offer a selection of types and
styles of shoes for most of the price lines stocked. For
women's shoes there is the oxford, the low-heeled
slipper, the high-heeled slipper, the open toe or open
heel or both, the conservative types, and the high-
mode types. Most styles need to be carried in several
colors and leathers. In the popular-priced field, the
number of styles offered in a single store will, other
things the same, be far fewer than in a store appealing
to wealthier customers, where several hundred style
numbers of women's shoes may be carried. But, at
best, it is difficult to limit selection for women's shoes
to less than several dozen numbers. The problem is,
of course, still more complicated for a family shoe
store.
All these problems the shoe retailer shares with most
other sorts of retail stores, but he has a special problem
in the variety of lengths and widths common to the
foot of man. The United States Army's schedule of GI
service shoes lists 239 combinations of size and width.
This is, of course, a singular wealth of selection. Most
feet fall in a relatively narrow range of sizes. A survey
of several hundred thousand pairs of shoes sold by a
group of large shoe factories indicated that about 85
percent of the sales were in 45combinationsof size
and width (about 33 per cent of a manufacturer's full
line); moreover, 66 per cent of the sales were in 16 (or
about 12 per For the most part, retailers will
stock a reasonably full line in 60 or more sizes.3
To the four dimensions—price, style, color, and size
—in terms of which a retailer must plan his stocks, we
may add a fifth—time. Both the volume of sales and the
sorts of shoes featured change from one season of the
year to the next, and retailers must build their stocks
in anticipation of these seasonal requirements. Es-
pecially for women's shoes, the short life of a style num-
ber—often no more than six weeks—creates serious
merchandising problems. Stocks are typically built
to a maximum in April and May and again in the fall;
they are reduced to a minimum in January and about
six months later, in midsummer. At their minimum, they
may average three-quarters of their maximum size.
The multidimensional character of a shoe retailer's
stocks suggests that they must be large. But it is equally
true that they must be small. "It is essential," the pro-
spective shoe retailer is warned, "that you maintain
the proper relationship between inventory and sales.
If your stock is too low, you lose sales; if too high, you
lose profits."They must be small because a retailer
makes money by buying and selling merchandise. At
any given time, he has a limited amount of capital in-
vested in the business. One important criterion by
which bankers, investors, and colleagues evaluate his
success is the amount of profit on invested capital. If a
shoe retailer makes a 2 per cent profit on sales, and
stocks turn twice a year, as they do in many shoe stores,
he will make a 6 per cent profit on capital invested in
merchandise, assuming a gross margin percentage of
33% per cent (on If they turn five times a
year, a figure probably attained by some chain systems,
he will make 15 per cent profit on capital invested in
merchandise, assuming the same gross margin per-
centage of 33%. Since capital invested in stock in trade
constitutes a very substantial portion of the total in-
vestment in most retail businesses, the effect on over-
all return on capital of changes in the rate of turnover
is great.
Another reason for the rigid limitation of stocks, par-
ticularly of women's shoes, is style obsolescence. The
seffing life of a high-style shoe is short. The need to
prepare ahead for peak-season sales, the uncertainty
that a model will be accepted, and the short span of
its life even if it proves popular mean that a retailer's
stocks can be cluttered with unsalable goods in a
twinkling. The pressure to hold stocks of high-style
goods at a minimum is apparent in the difference be-
tween usual stock-turnover ratios of women's and men's
shoes. Because of the greater variety in women's shoe
styles, one would suppose that a greater assortment,
and therefore a larger stock, would be required per
unit of sales in women's shoe departments than in
men's. Actually, the figures indicate the reverse: stocks
of women's shoes turn more rapidly than those of
men's. The reason, in part, may be a tendency for man-
ufacturers of style merchandise to attract customers
by supplying rapid factory-to-store deliveries; stores
therefore need smaller stocks. For the more staple
men's shoes, a low price may be relatively somewhat
more attractive than fast deliveries. In part, the faster
turnover of women's shoe stocks seems to be a function
4lbid., p. 68.
Example:Sales
Profit on sales at 2%
Cost of goods sold (with 38¼%
gross margin)
Cost of average goods in stock
(assuming two turns a year)
Profit of $1,500 on $25,000
$4.95 and conservative shoes between $6.50 and $6.95, or
style shoes at $3.95 and conservative shoes at $5.00. (The study
was done by Edwin Hahn in cooperation with J. C. Schnitzer,
under the direction of H. B. McCoy.)
2 Ibid., pp. 85 if. Although the off-size foot was probably
never as well shod (however much abused) as in the United
States Army, a large men's shoe factory reports that they sold
1c29 different combinations of size and width, and a large wom-
en's shoe factory gave a comparable figure of 145.
A department store recently advertised a women's oxford
in 160 sizes. High-style shoes may be stocked in considerably
fewer sizes, especially the. open-toed women's shoe, for which
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of a larger scale of operations, which permit adequate
selections without necessarily causing stocks to be high
relative to sales. In any event, the challenge with which
proper stock control confronts management is visible in
the surprising difference in average turnover achieved
in independent and chain shoe stores or in profitable
and unprofitable shoe stores.°
The burden of all this is simply that the size of stocks
must be a matter of central importance to a shoe re-
tailer. Consequently enforcement of stock objectives,
whatever they are, must rank high among the many
necessarily conflicting objectivesthat management
pursues.
What objectives do shoe retailers actually hold with
respect to the size of their stock?
INTENDED SIZE OF STOCK
The proper size of stock depends, in part, on con-
siderations focused on the adequate servicing of sales.
But the determination of the best thne to buy also
influences the size of stock, though the influence may
be indirect. The determination is concerned primarily
with ascertaining the proper time to agree on a price
or to reserve suppliers' capacity, and the direct in-
fluence therefore is on stock on hand and on order
rather than on stock on hand only. Nevertheless, judg-
ments about the market—often too narrowly called
speculative—have a bearing on the intended size of
stock on hand as well as on order. The matter is im-
portant and requires the full treatment to which the
next chapter is devoted. Here we deal primarily with
6Theturnover ratio, averaged for the years 1928 through
1941 for shoe departments of department stores, was 2.0 for
men's and 2.5 for women's shoe departments (annual issues of
the Controllers' Congress of the National Retail Dry Coods
Association's Departmental Merchandising and Operating Re-
sults for Department and Specialty Stores). For eighty-one
companies canvassed in a study of the National Shoe Retailers
Association in 1936, the ratio to annual sales of the annual
average of monthly inventories was 2.2 for men's shoes, 3.3 for
women's shoes in profitable shoe stores; for unprofitable com-
panies, the corresponding ratios were 1.6 and 1.9 (Retail Shoe
Stores and Leased Shoe Departments, National Shoe Retailers
Association, 1987, p. 17, an analysis of operating and merchan-
dising experience for 1936). The big difference between the
ratios achieved for women's shoes in profitable and unprofitable
stores is an eloquent statistic. In 1989, the census tabulations
for chain shoe stores show that stock, raised approximately to
retail level, turned 3.8 times a year in men's shoe chain stores
and 6.0 in women's. The corresponding figures for independent
shoe stores were L8 and 2.9 for men's and women's shoe
stores, respectively. Since these figures are based on year-end
inventory records, their level is too high to express average
turnover for the year. The relationship among the figures, how-
ever, need not be systematically altered.
The sales of men's-shoe chain stores average $42,837 per
store in 1989; those of women's-shoe chain stores averaged
$75,478. The corresponding figures for independent stores were
$12,642 for men's and $86,770 for women's shoe stores (Census
of Business, Vol. I: Retail Trade: 1939, Part I, Table 2A, p. 58;
Table 20, p. 179).
stocks and buying procedures under the assumption
of stable market prospects: we abstract from buyers'
shifting judgments about the condition of whole-
sale shoe markets.
It is difficult to get a clear picture of just the
proper size of stocks is determined by shoe retailers
or, more particularly, how the size of stocks is intended
to change from time to time. Retailers with whom I
have spoken claim that they aim to keep the ratio of
sales to stocks about constant from season to season—
constant, that is, between successive fall-winter sea-
sons or spring-summer seasons. Of course, whcn turn-
over is slow, as it is in a retail shoe store, a change in
an annual sales-stock ratio of a few tenths of a point
(which may not be considered much of a change in
the ratio) will make a substantial difference in the
absolute size of stocks, so that the intention "to hold
a ratio about constant" may be consistent with siz-
able changes in stocks. Moreover, if one stops to think
of the kind of problem involved in providing for the
necessary monthly changes in quantity and kinds of
shoes, it is hard to see how, at best, the ratio could be
held more than approximately constant.
Retailers claim that they try to anticipate
requirements, and to begin a month when sales are
typically high with larger stocks than they would a
month of low customer demand. Seasonal indexes sug-
gest that, on the average, this purpose seems broadly
achieved. We see, for example, in Table 33 that stocks
are built up by the end of one month to meet the ex-
pected volume of sales in the next: the size of the sea-
sonal index of stocks at the end of one month is cor-
related with the seasonal index of sales the next
month, as rank standings show. The correlation is high
(+.89); but what is far more significant, it is also quite
high (+.81) when the change in stock between the be-
ginning and end of the preceding month is correlated
with the change in sales from the preceding to current
month. Both correlations are poor when comparisons
are made on a current basis (columns 4 and 8). Of
course, the suggestion that retailers seem to be success-
ful in relating, on the average, their beginning-of-
month stocks to the seasonal variations in does
not mean that they are successful all of the time. It
means, rather, that errors, having no systematic bias,
cancel out—both as among retailers and over time.
This being so, the seasonal indexes may be interpreted
as indicative of intentions.
With this in mind, we glance again at the tfible to
see what it says of the extent of the preparations for
monthly changes in sales.7 We see at the foot of col-
"The stock index was multiplied by the usual ratio of
stocks to sales in order to convert the two indexes to coroparable
absolute amounts of shoes. Change from month to month in98 CHAPTER8
TABLE 33
Association between Average Seasonal Patterns for Sales and Stocks, Shoe Departments of Department Stores. 1926—1940 a
• umns 6and 7 that the change in stock average is only
• about a third again as much as the change in sales. In
other words, retailers seem to accumulate primarily
the seasonal merchandise they expect to sell shortly,
not this amount times the usual sales-stock ratio. Con-
sequently, sales-stock ratios vary considerably from
'month to month; they are high in the months of large
sales and low when sales are slack. These observations,
based on the statistics, agree with what retailers say
and retailing textbooks teach.
The amount of staple, nonseasonal shoes to be car-
ried in stock is, for seasonal shoes, a function of ex-
pected sales. The merchandising manuals say that
adequate stocks will, on the average, represent 'a speci-
fied multiple of usual weekly sales. Because shoes are
not bought by retailers every hour or 'day, the actual
size of stock must vary, and a proper minimum and
maximum figure will be set. The minimum figure de-
pends on the cushion thought necessary to meet varia-
tions in the sizes and models that customers require
and unexpected spurts in sales or delays in delivery,
as well as on the usual time required for an order to be
delivered. Thus, if for a certain line of shoes a two-
week cushion is thought advisable, and it takes three
stocks would then be compared with the seasonal changes in
sales which the stock change presumably anticipates.
weeks to get delivery, a five-week supply represents the
minimum stock; replenishment is called for when stock
drops to this figure. The amount ordered depends on
the maximum figure, which, in turn, depends on the
factors already mentioned plus the frequency with
which it is practical to place new orders (or the mini-
mum acceptable size of an order). For a fast-moving
staple line, these sizing-up orders may be placed every
week or two weeks, thus (continuing with our ex-
ample) causing maximum stocks to be a six- to seven-
week supply.
This procedure yields an implicit stock objective that
is somewhere between a fixed absolute amount and a
fixed ratio to sales (and is a function also of delivery
periods). Which it approaches will depend on how a
week's sales are estimated. If a planned and un-
changed sales figure is used, planned stocks will tend
to be held at a fixed level; if actual sales are the basis
of the calculation, planned stock will maintain a more
or less fixed ratio to expected sales. In actual practice,
the sales figure probably has some stability, but may
be altered whenever sales seem to establish themselves
at a new level.
These instructions concerning sizing-up orders bear
another interesting piece of information. We noted that
a reasonable figure for minimum stocks of staple lines
CHANGE FROM PREVIOUS MONTH
STOCKS, STOCKS AT BANK STANDING Rank Standing
END OF ABSOLUTE OF SALES MINUS Stocks at of Sales
SALES, MONTH, LEVEL OF STANDING OF STOCK Comparable minus Stock ci
INDEX INDEX SALES SamePrevious Absolute Same Previous
NUMBERS NUMBERS INDEX b MonthMonth Sales Level Month Month
(1) (2) (8) (4) (5) (6) (7) •(8) (9)
January 73.0 85.1 408.5 —3 —1 —93.0 43.7 +2 • 0
February 63.9 95.6 458.9 +4 0 —9.1 +50.4 +7.5 —1
'March 96.5 102.8 493.4 +2 0 +82.6 +34.5 0 +1.5
April 108.2 105.7 507.4 +1 —1 +11.7 +14.0 —4 +1
May 111.5 109.2 524.2 +2 0 +3.3 +18.8 —1 ' —2
June 119.1 95.0 456.0 —7 0 +7.6 —88.2 —6 —2
July 72.7 88.7 425.8 —1 +1 —46.4 —30.2
•+2 0
August 69.8 99.2 476.2 +4 0 —2.9 +50.4 +6.5 —1
September 116.6 103.8 495.8 —2 —4 +46.8 +19.6 —4 +0.5
October 101.0 107.9 517.9 +4 +2 —15.6 +22.1 +6 +4
November 101.4 112.8 539.0 +5 +3 +0.4 +21.1 +2 +8
December 166.0 94.2 452.2 —9 0 +64.6
• —86.8 —11
Average 100 •100 480 0 0 27.8 e 38.2° 0 0
Coefficient of rank correlation for sales and stocks +.21+.89 —.18 +.81
a Indexesare weighted averages for seasonal patterns for eEachmonth was assigned a rank position for column 1 and
men's and women's shoe departments of department stores, then for column 2. In column 4 the rank figure for column 2 was
which were used to construct "Department-Store Shoe Sales," subtracted from that of column 1 for the same month; in column
Stock Sample (series 28 in Appendix B) and "Department-Store 5 the stock figure for the previous month (in effect, for the be-
Shoe Stock" (series 49). ginning rather than end of the month during which sales are
b Column 2 multiplied by 4.8, the average ratio of stocks to recorded) is compared with current sales.
monthly sales for shoe departments of department stores in 1939, ° Same procedure as described in note c, except that columns
according to information collected by the Controllers' Congress 8 and 7 were used instead of columns 1 and 2.
of the National Retail Dry Goods Association. eAverage,ignoring signs.RETAILERS' BUYING—i 99
might be a five-week supply and for maximum stocks
a seven-week supply, thus suggesting average stocks of
about a month and a half's supply. Yet the average
amount of stocks actually held are far larger than this
—perhaps around three or four months' supply. These
apparently inconsistent facts tell us a great deal about
the character of retail shoe stocks. The slow average
turnover results, in large measure, from the presence
in any stock of many models that sell poorly. An actual
average turnover figure is almost never a planned turn-
over for any given group of shoes, since its size is in
important part the result of the inevitable occurrence
of all sorts of unplanned and undesired divergences be-
tween what customers do and what they are expected
to do.
To summarize: The intended size of stocks is deter-
mined by considering the sorts and sizes of shoes that
would constitute a proper basis of customer selection
month by month. The number of shoes to be carried
for each model is a function of the rate at which it is
expected to sell, and consequently total planned stocks
must bear a broadly positive relation to expected sales,
other things the same. Actually, average or incremental
ratios are likely to be used in the course of the plan-
ning procedure. But it does not seem realistic to pic-
ture retailers as governing their buying, week in, week
out, with a view to achieving a stipulated sales-stock
ratio in the short run. Both random, and especially sea-
sonal, variation in sales, and consequently in sales-stock
ratios, are too great. A more feasible objective is the
achievement of a given absolute stock stipulated in
terms of each of its component lines, or a beginning-of-
month stock that is roughly larger (or smaller) than
that of the previous month by the amount that sales
are expected to be larger (or smaller). As time pro-
ceeds, objectives may be modified on the basis of
judgments on whether sales in particular categories are
higher or lower than they were expected to be when
stocks were planned. But such revision, since it pri-
marily involves unexpected change in particular lines,
would tend to steady incremental, rather than average,
ratios. Average ratios, on the other hand, are probably
used in retrospect—as a check on departmental or
store achievement and as a broad test of management
efficiency. Thus the rate of turnover must figure in the
planning of stocks and in the review of stock perform-
ance; it is not likely to be used in correcting the dif-
ference between actual and planned stock. For this
purpose, it is hard enough to keep track of short-term
changes in one variable—stocks—without complicat-
ing the problem by their relation to a second variable
—sales, particularly since it must be future and ex-
pected sales rather than past sales to which stocks
ought to be linked.
All this results, as far as I can judge, in a tendency
for stocks to move in the same direction as sides but
not in the same proportion (if we abstract from buying
associated with changes in market prospects). It is
more likely that the incremental, rather than the aver-
age, ratio will remain approximately constant for in-
tended stocks: stocks may need to be increasell by an
amount proportional to the increase in sales, and anal-
ogously when sales decrease.
But whatever the size that shoe retailers wish their
stocks to be, two characteristics of the objective ap-
pear central to the dynamics of demand transmission:
it is reasonably precise and its validation receives high
management priority.
Provision for Sales and for Intended Changes
irs Stocks
What are the circumstances that prescribe the form
that the effort to validate the stock objective takes?
What is the pattern of ordering that these efforts yield?
We cannot distinguish, in practice, between buying
to validate stock objectives and to provide for sales.
But when stock objectives are reasonably clear, and
only then, a conceptual separation is meaningful; then
some orders may be thought of as intended to rrovide
for desired change in stock, some to compensate for
undesired change, and some to provide for expected
sales. But this is an analytic, not an operational, dis-
tinction. To study operations, we must include the
whole procedure involved in buying merchandise.
RETAILERS' BUYING PROCEDURES 8
Whenthe new lines are first assembled and shown
by shoe manufacturers, usually in November and De-
cember or early January for Easter styles, and in May
or June for the fall models, retailers place "preseason"
advance orders which may cover between 35 and 6.
per cent of estimated sales for the next six months.
(When and why they move through this range is the
subject of the following chapter.) As the season pro-
gresses, "secondary" orders are placed for delivery in
perhaps two months, more or less. In addition, retailers
typically order some goods for "at-once" delivery; and
in this case the receipt of the order may be expected
within a few weeks or even less, sometimes in a few
days if the shoe is carried by the "in-stock" department
of a manufacturer or or it may not be
8want to remind the reader that the discussion is confined
to the interwar period. During and since World War II there
seem to have been changes in some of the quantitative aspects
of the procedures, though, as far as I know, their basic character
remains essentially the same.
9Forsmall shoe retailers who do a large proportion of their
business through wholesalers rather than manufacturnrs, an100 CHAPTER 8
expected for six weeks or so if it must be made to order
and factories are active. These orders for immediate
delivery may take care of unexpected developments,
or they may simply be quite routine fill-in orders, or
they may represent the slack in the "open-to-buy" 10
position intentionally left to "sweeten stocks" at the
latest possible moment.
This is the picture conveyed by retailers and shoe
manufacturers. Unfortunately, we cannot view it in
statistics on orders, since the only ones available in-
clude orders for leather, for which seasonal patterns,
though probably not cyclical ones, are notably different
from those of orders for shoes. Indirectly, however, it
appears in the character of the seasonal pattern of shoe
production, which is far less extreme than the pattern
of retail sales (the average deviation from 100 each
month is ±9.3 for production and ± 19.5 for sales)
Because of the reluctance of most shoe manufacturers
to undertake production without a confirmed order,
we must rule out the possibility that the seasonal pat-
tern of shoe factories, damped relative to that of retail
shoe stores, could be explained entirely by manufac-
turers' willingness to undertake production in dull
months in anticipation of active months to come. Much
if not most of this advance production is doubtless set
in motion by retailers in the form of the longer-term
orders, which makes it possible for manufacturers to
smooth their production schedules.
The basic picture, then, is of a battery of orders that
converge to supply the desired receipts of a given
month. Desired receipts, in turn, consist of merchandise
expected to be sold plus the intended increase (or
minus the decrease) in stocks. Of course, both desired
receipts and desired stock change may shift as the
future unfolds.
Management forms and routines are required to
achieve the necessary coordination of buying with
desired receipts, particularly in a large store. The "mer-
chandise budget" is a means to that end. In it, expected
sales and desired change in beginning-of-month stocks
are translated via the open-to-buy position into an ag-
gregate value of merchandise that may be bought for
delivery each month. The open-to-buy position is:
desired receipts for a given month minus those already
on hand or contracted for in confirmed orders. As
orders are placed, the open-to-buy position is reduced,
until the final order for immediate delivery closes it
order placed with the wholesalers will often be delivered in
several lots—some very rapidly, and others in a month or more,
if the wholesaler has to order the shoes before shipping them.
10 See third paragraph, below.
11 These figures are based on indexes for 1926 to 1941. The
retail index is a simple average of the index for department
stores and for chain shoe stores. The production index is based
on total production.
entirely. In this way the aggregate. volume of orders
(some placed before the season opened, some at vari-
ous subsequent dates) is controlled so as to equal the
desired receipts in the month on which orders con-
verge.
But if orders must be placed several months in ad-
vance, it is obvious that a guess must be made as to
what sales will be. Indeed, the sales forecast is the
foundation of the merchandise budget.
SALES FORECAST
In a large store, forecasting sales and setting up the
budget is likely to be a full-dress affair undertaken
at least twice a year. I have mentioned these forecasts
in connection with the designing of model stocks, but
they form the basis of a wide variety of other plans,
including the amount of money to be spent on mer-
chandise each month.
In the fall, executives start to compute figures for
the period of, perhaps, February to August or January
to July; those for the second six-month period are
typically undertaken in early spring. The basic start-
ing figure is likely to be the sales for the corresponding
period of the previous year or few years.12 The figures
may then be adjusted for the amount by which the
store or department has been going ahead or behind.
Finally, further corrections may be made on the basis
of evaluations of a wide variety of special or general
business conditions. In a large store, executives of many
subdivisions are asked to submit estimates of what
their sales are likely to be. These guesses, often over-
sanguine, are likely to be pared by the next higher
groups to which they are submitted. The sum of the
estimates will be scrutinized by top executives study-
ing its component parts, the sales history of the en-
tire company, and business conditions expected to in-
fluence sales and prices. The guess concerning the
future will be based on a variety of sources: salesmen's
reports, trade gossip, and personal contacts with man-
ufacturers or competitors; market services and con-
ferences with trusted advisers. Pet statistical indicators
may also be scrutinized. For example, one national or-
ganization reported that sales of stores in certain in-
dustrial towns show early trends; another company,
selling popular-priced men's shoes, found the trend in
industrial payrolls (as revealed by a twelve-month
moving average) a good prognosticator of its own
sales. In small stores in which management techniques
are less formalized, the guess about sales for a given
month in the future may be little more than the sales
of the corresponding month of the previous year, ad-
12 Jf seasonal patterns are well understood, seasonally ad-
justed sales for the previous few months may be used to predict
seasonally adjusted sales for the next few months.justed for any known peculiarities of that month and
sometimes also by the percentage amount by which
sales for the past half year or so have seemed to exceed
or fall short of those of the corresponding months of the
previous year.
Any forecasts are likely to be in error a good part of
the time. Were the forecast a mere guess on the part
of each retailer, the error would tend to be randomly
distributed, and we could not draw its profile for the
group as a whole. But the fundamental characteris-
tic of the procedures just described is that forecasts are
not mere guesses but modified projections of past sales.
Errors, therefore, will not be haphazard but linked
to the pattern of sales and the type of the projection.
As far as I have been able to learn, it is the level of
past sales that is projected with, in effect, some sort of
seasonal adjustment. I have found no indication that
the rates of change are projected over the period of
the forecast. (When forecasts based on corresponding
months of the previous year are corrected for change
between the current month and a year ago, this pro-
jects a rate of change only up to the bridgehead of the
forecast, not over its span.) Although we cannot rule
out the possibility that rates of change are projected
in some stores at some time, I think it is uncommon.
If, then, the central bias of the forecasts is that they
reflect the current level of sales, the central bias of the
error of forecast will reflect the rate of change in sales.
UNINTENDEDCHANGE INSTOCKS
Orders based on incorrect forecasts of sales will re-
sult in receipts of shoes that differ from actual sales
plus or minus the change in stock desired at the time
the order was placed. (They may even differ still more
because of changed expectations and a related change
in desired stock.) From what we know about stock
objectives, the nature of ordering procedure, and the
character of the sales forecast the pattern of unin-
tended change in stocks may be deduced: it will reflect
inversely the rate of change in sales over the recent
past and perhaps also from one year to the next.
It would be desirable to test this deduction by re-
course to statistics, but, of course, we have no time
series on unintended change in stocks. But the size of
actual stocks should be a function partly of their in-.
tended size and partly of the failure to achieve inten-
tions. We noted earlier that stocks aie probably in-
tended, season by season, to bear a rough positive
relation to the size of sales. Combining the two prop-
ositions, we arrive at a hypothesis that may be tested:
The size of retailers' shoe stocks will be directly re-
lated to salesand inversely related to the change
Notethat the proposition as I put it does not specify the
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in sales over recent months (and to some extent be-
tween corresponding months of the previous year).
The data to which this question can be referred
are far from ideal; they are the statistics on shoe in-
ventories of department stores, which are of poorer
quality than those on sales.14 First we correlate sales
and stocks in constant prices (series 29 and 50). The
straight-line equation develops the parameters, with
index numbers used for stocks and sales (1939 —100):
(1) Stocks = 34.4 + 0.63 sales
But stocks are very poorly explained by this foruiula, as
Chart 17 shows.
The difference between the estimated and the actual
stocks is shown in Chart 18, as is the rate of change in
sales over the previous five months.15 The association
between the error term and the difference series seems
quite clear (only 26 per cent of the months are in un-
like phase), and indicates the desirability of adding
the rate of change as one of the independent variables.
This addition develops the following equation:
(2) Stocks = 12.2 +0.86 sales —0.53sales change
The second set of lines in Chart 17 shows how stock,
computed according to this formula, compares with
actual stock as recorded by our index. The sales-change
variable has the expected negative sign. The regres-
sion coefficients for sales and change in sales are, re-
spectively, 17.8 and 10.3 times their standard error of
estimate. Estimated stocks show some tendency to lag
sales (last line in Chart 17) as they should. Also, the
sign and size of the parameters are consistent with
a monthly sales-stock ratio that has the general sub-
cyclical characteristics of the actual ratio—positive
conformity to sales and a lead.1° But the coefficient
RETAILERS' BUYING—i
character of the relation, which could be a constant average or
constant incremental ratio, or neither.
14 Fewer stores submit information on stock.Also, price
change introduces ambiguity in evaluation and hazards for
deflation. And there are other problems, too. See Appendix B,
series 49.
sixth previous month is subtracted from the current
month. Some other set of differences, such as those discussed
in the section "Pattern of the Corrective Order," might have
been preferable theoretically, though there is no indication that
it would have been in practice. This one was selected at the
time the work was done, and the data do not warrant further
refinement.
16 The small value at the intercept and a coefficient of sales
of close to 1 would tend to cause the average ratio of intended
sales to stocks to be nearly constant though having sonle posi-
tive conformity to sales. Also, when the rate of change in sales
is positive and rising, stocks, other things the same, will have
a negative influence of increasing size exerted upon them and
thus tend to turn over ever more rapidly. Since the positive rate
at which sales rise often reaches a maximtun several months be-
fore the turn, this point would also be that of the highest stock
turn, other things the same. These statements may be transposed
to apply to contractions.102 CHAPTER 8
CHART1.7
Shoe Stocks of Department Stores Estimated by Two Equations, 1926—1940
Specific-cycle turns are marked by X, specific-subcycle turns by 0,. and retardations by
Index numbers (1939 = 100) are for dollar values adjusted for change in shoe prices. Stocks are stated at
retail prices.
of multiple correlation is .801—not high. The calcula-
tion fails in several instances to reproduce the level of
the actual stock series correctly and the full extent
of its lag relative to sales. In general, the errors
estimate, shown in the last line on Chart 18,ar'è sub-
stantial and do not appear randomly distributed. By
comparing them with various other time series, I have
tried to spot variables whose inclusion might improve
the explanation, but the results were negative.17
17looked especially to see whether a different system of
forecasting sales, and consequently a different pattern of errors,
might benefit the calculation, but results were negative. Visual
comparison and tests of the nimiber of months in unlike phase
suggested that no improvement would result. Another possi-
bility rejected by the data is that the stable sales-stock relation-
But in spite of the marked deficiencies of the esti-,
mates, it may be worthwhile to look for a moment at
the implications of the coefficients. I do this more as
an exercise than as a sound deduction. For when the
inaccuracies in the data are considered in conjunction
with the inapplicability of much of probability theory
to monthly observations of cumulative data like stocks,
estimates of reliability seem of little value. Therefore I
use the central values only, as expressed in the co-
efficients in equation 2, to judge the implication of the
ship held not between current stocks and sales, but between
current stocks and sales at the earlier date when demand has
been forecast and advance orders placed. I looked also for the
presence of speculative factors in the unexplained




See the text for a description of the estimating équations and the note to Chart 17 for a description of the
index numbers.
calculated parameters, could they be accredited. First
and foremost, we find the association of stocks with
sales positive, and with recent changes in sales nega-
tive, and this accords with our analysis of intended and
unintended aspects of the control of retailers' shoe
stocks. Next, we wish to judge the meaning of the co-
efficient of sales, which presumably reflects intentions.
Implicit in the selection of the straight-line equation
is a constant incremental intended sales-stock ratio
expressed in the coefficient; but the size of the ratio
(the coefficient of sales) is yielded by the line-fitting
process. Since both the sales and stock data were in-
dex numbers with an average value of 100 for the
period, a coefficient of 1 would have meant that the
incremental relationship and average relationship were
equal. (Had they been equal, the constant term would
have been zero.) The fact that the coefficient was only
a little less than 1 we interpret as meaning that in-
tended stock change was consistent with an tiverage
sales-stock ratio not much lower than the incremental
ratio.18 Further, due to the small constant teirm, the
average ratio was not much lower at low than at high
levels of This provides an interesting not
18Remember,however, that the relationship would reflect
changes in stocks associated with shifting market prospects,
which would tend to amplify the positive association of stocks
and sales.
19Onthe average, shoe stocks of large department stores in
1939, as reported by the Controllers' Congress, were 4.80 times
monthly sales. The coefficient of sales in the multiple-regression
equation converted to the proper absolute relationship bstocks
is 4.13. Ignoring the sales-change term, which would be close
to zero for the series as a whole, total stocks would be 4.88
times sales in the month when sales were smallest (October
Actual minus Estimated Department-Store Shoe Stocks for Two
Regression Equations, 1926—1940
Index numbers Index numbers
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unreasonable contrast to seasonal patterns in the as-
sociation of sales and stocks, for which the incremental
ratio seemed far larger than the average.20 Finally, it
would be interesting to learn the importance of unin-
tended change in stock (the change in the sales param-
eter). The calculation suggests that the sales-stock
ratio would vary more as a result of unintended than
of intended stock change.21
I conclude that these data are at least consistent with
the thought that unintended inventory change in the
.stocks of shoe retailers tends to be inversely associated
with the rate at which consumer buying is changing,
and that the matter is of quantitative importance.
Correction or Prevention of Unintended
Change in Stock
If the proper size of stock is clearly defined, and if
deem it important to see that stock achieves
•the correct figure, then unintended change in stock is
likely to be prevented or corrected. How?
ADJUSTMENT OF SELLING PRICE
Oneway to bring the amount of stock in line with a
specific objective is to mark down selling prices if
stocks are too high and to mark them up if they are too
low. Note, however, that I speak here not of the gen-
eral question of flexibility of prices—the extent to
which they are raised or lowered in line with changing
costs or consumers' ability to pay, or both—but merely
of the use of markdowns or markups as a method for
correcting unintended change in inventories.
First, with respect to reduction in selling price: Cer-
tainly, seasonal models that have sold badly are closed
out in markdown sales when the time for clearance
comes around, a time competitors attempt to formalize
as much as possible. This is also true of models that
1933) and 4.64 times sales in the month when sales were at
their maximum (November 1940). Converted to annual stock-
turnover ratios, the figures for low and high months, respec-
tively, are 2.47 and 2.59; and it seems likely that ratios that
varied between 2.5 and 2.6 would be regarded as virtually
constant by retailers.
20 See Table 31 and the discussion of it.
21 Following the line of calculation used in note 19, above,
we can hold sales constant at the average for the series. Then
at the extreme sales-change figures of + 12.62 in March 1934
and —12.58 in August 1933, stocks would range from 4.25
to 5.19 times monthly sales. This gives an annual turnover of
2.82 and 2.31, respectively. If instead of the all-time highs and
lows we take the average peak or trough standing for the spe-
cific subcycles in sales change, the stock-sales ratio at peaks
(sales change averaging +7.80) would be 4.43 and at troughs
(sales change averaging —6.49), 4.96; these figures correspond
to annual turnover ratios of 2.71 and 2.42. This implies that,
according to the equation, the influence of sales change in
causing fluctuation in the sales-stock ratio is likely to be greater,
especially during the shorter fluctuations, than the influence of
sales.
are not being reordered, and in which sizes have been
decimated. There will be very considerably more of
such shoes when there has been an unexpected turn for
the worse than at other times. But for shoes that are
still considered part of the regular line, frequent stim-
ulation of sales through markdowns is not practical.
To change price tags on regular lines is awkward,
time-consuming, even embarrassing since suppliers
may object. It is, therefore, unsuitable as a means to
correct rapidly and frequently for failure to maintain a
model stock at the intended level. A glint of evidence
on this score, other than what retailers say of their
problems and procedures, may be found in figures on
markdowns of shoe departments of department stores
collected by the Controllers' Congress of the National
Retail Dry Goods Association. The average annual
figure for these markdowns as a percentage of sales,
1928—1941, varied between about 7.5 (1928) and 12
(1932) per cent of sales.22 In 1931 the figure was
also very high—about 11.5 per cent—yet in the
NRDGA Merchandise Manual covering 1931, it is said
that 95 per cent of the sales forecasts had been too
optimistic in that year. Most stores had prophesied an
increase in sales whereas sizable decreases were the
rule. Obviously, the larger than usual markdowns can
have provided only a small part of the correction re-
quired to return stocks to the appropriate figure.
Second, with respect to increases in prices: When
sales have been unexpectedly good, to raise price tags
with some temporary objective in mind would be a
most unorthodox retailing procedure. Retail prices
are usually set by the application of a given markup to
manufacturers' prices. The average markup to be
achieved in a given department or for a given class of
shoes is fairly well standardized, though it may vary
somewhat from model to model. Retailers typically do
not even depart from this procedure when, because of
an especially advantageous purchase, the application
of the usual margin yields lower selling prices than
those of most competitors. Certainly it would be most
unorthodox to price an article at a figure temporarily
higher than the price that would be charged after the
temporary dearth of merchandise had righted itself;
such a notion would appear comical to most retailers.
In general, then, though revision of selling prices
plays some part in reversing undesired change in stock,
especially increases, in the short run, its role is a minor
one in retail shoe stores. This fact is fundamental.
Wherever selling price rather than revision of buying
schedules is the primary short-term adjusting mech-
anism used by the individual company, it is demand
which is adjusted to supply rather than, as when buy-
22 The figures I give are simple averages of median or typical
figures for each of five store size-groups of men's and women's
shoe departments, weighted 40 and 60, respectively.RETAILERS' BUYING—i 105
ing schedules are changed, supply which is adjusted
to demand. Obviously, the effect on suppliersis
bound to be quite different.
ADJUSTMENT OF NEW ORDERS
In a retail shoe store, the usual first-line remedy for
incorrect forecasts that result in errors in buying is
the adjustment of new orders—typically orders for
short-term delivery. That adjustments will be made is
implicit in all that has been said about the importance
of having the proper selection and quantity of shoes
on hand. The very structure of orders—the use of a
battery that requires advance commitments to pro-
vide desired goods for the seasonal peaks but retains
some leeway to adjust to unfolding circumstance—
attests to its use to prevent, as well as to correct,
disadvantageous change in stocks.
The correction may occur as the result of manage-
ment signals that flash red or green before stocks have
had a chance to be affected and thus forestall un-
intended change in stocks. In large stores, we noted
earlier, the semiannual merchandise budget is set up,
and the desired receipts of merchandise each month
are formulated on the basis of expected sales and de-
sired change in stock. At any given time, buyers are
open-to-buy total budgeted receipts minus goods al-
ready on order, and they do so in sequential orders
of shortening term as the month approaches. But in
many stores the open-to-buy position does not stand
indefinitely as originally budgeted but is corrected for
the difference between planned and actual sales in
the previous month and planned and actual beginning-
of-month stocks.28 This formalizes the impact on short-
term buying of the difference between plans and ac-
tuality. Sometimes the semiannual forecasts themselves
may be corrected and with them the initial open-to-buy
figure.24
In stores where a semiannual estimate of sales is
not used as a direct guide to buying, the adjustment
can take place without much specific attention as the
target date approaches. Thus a retailer places second-
ary orders, say for Easter shoes, in January or February
on the basis of a much closer guess of what sales will
be than he was able to make when pre-season orders
were placed in November or December. The same re-
mark applies in more extreme form when orders for
immediate delivery are placed later still. Each suc-
cessive guess about Easter requirements will probably
23Thisis the difference between plans and actual stock at
the latest moment possible.
24Executivesof retail stores have said that such revision
may be made within several weeks or several months if the
divergence between expectations and actuality cannot be ex-
plained in terms of weather, special promotions, etc. When
early buying has been based simply on the volume of sales
during the same months of the previous year, revisions in the
light of current experience are expected.
follow the pattern of the longer guesses, which is likely
to be primarily a projection of sales of the recent past.
But if earlier orders proved heavy, at-once orders will
shrink; if earlier orders proved light, at-once orders
will swell.
In stores, large or small, the correction can be based
directly on the size of unintended change in stock as
revealed by unit stock-control systems or over-all sales-
stock ratios. Finally, the clerk-executed fill-in order
automatically keeps stocks in line with plans by post-
poning new orders until stocks have actually reached
the planned reorder point.
In one way or another, then, corrections of new
orders tend to keep receipts in line with actual sales
and' thus to keep stocks constant (except for their
seasonal patterns). Were stocks intended to vary
somewhat with the level of sales, corrections would
increase but not change their sign, since desired re-
ceipts would include changes in stocks to
cause stocks to rise or fall with expected sales.
PATTERN OF THE CORRECTIVE ORDER
We have learned that by and large in retail shoe
stores, a substantial fraction of the shoes to be sold
need to be ordered well ahead of time. MOreover,
stock objectives are sufficiently concise and firmly
held so that divergence from them tends to be pre-
vented, or corrected after it has occurred. The cas-
caded character of orders furthers this purpose, which
is pursued primarily by adjusting orders rather than
selling prices. We have learned further that forecasts
of sales tend to have a systematic bias that may be
stated in terms of a relationship to sales of the recent
past.
These several findings imply that by making more
specffic assumptions about the actual stock-size ob-
jective and the way in which past sales are projected
as forecasts of the future, we can construct a model
in which errors in buying—and, consequently, their
corrections—may be stated in terms of retail sales and
their rate of change. I think it will be most useful to
confine our model to buying linked not to rigid six-
month forecasts embodied in a merchandise budget,
but rather to running forecasts and orders. These or-
ders would have a seasonal pattern, both in the aggre-
gate and in their distribution among orders of various
terms, but for analytic purposes the seasonal pattern
may be ignored. This less formalized procedure forms
at least one aspect of the buying in stores that have
elaborate semiannual sales and buying budgets, and is
the major buying procedure in stores that do not. It
is thus probably the prototype, containing the ele-
ments of the more formal methods. I start with a set
of rigid assumptions (other variants are discussed in
passing) and examine their implications. Later we106 CHAPTER8
shall relax some of them to see how the deductions
change. The first set of assumptions follows:
1. Stocks are intended to remain at a fixed figure.
2. Past sales are projected horizontally (the level is
projected but not a rate of change).
3. The sales of only a single month are projected
(a highly rigid assumption).
4. Once an order is placed on the basis of a forecast,
no revisions are made until the anticipated month
actually comes around.
5. Buyers believe that market prospects are stable.
More specifically, the proportion of an expected
season's sales for which orders of specified term
areoriginally placed does not change from
month to month (the advance order ratio remains
invariant).
Orders are placed, say, in December, on the basis of
current sales (after an allowance for seasonal pat-
terns), S_3,forexpected Easter (in March) sales,
S0. When March comes around, actual sales will have
differed from receipts by S_3 —S0,and this will be
the amount of unintended stock change. Orders to
restore stocks to their planned level will be the same,
with signs reversed, S0 —S_3.
If, on the other hand, retailers have no clear no-
tion of seasonal patterns, they may use sales of the
previous March (S_12) for the forecast, correcting the
figure perhaps by the amount by which sales in the
current month are running ahead of the correspond-
ing month of the previous year. If comparisons are
made on a ratio rather than a difference basis, then
100(S_3/S_15) —100would be the per cent by which
sales are going ahead. Forecast sales for March would
be S_12(S_8/S..15), the error S_12(S_3/S_15) —S0,
and orders to correct the errors S0—S_12(S_3/S_15);
this expression may be rewritten S0 —S_3(S_12/S_15)
to highlight its relation to the comparable one, in which
forecasts are based simply on seasonally adjusted sales
in the month when the advance orders are placed. The
difference between the two is this: the error now has
an inverse relationship to the amount (in ratio form)
that sales changed during those months of the previous
year which constitute the span of the forecast this year.
What has been said applies to an order three months
ahead, but we could simply repeat each statement for
orders of shorter term after appropriate alteration of
the month when forecasts are made. We assume that
retailers will typically make as short a guess as they
can and thus, whether formally or informally, revise
their sales estimates on the basis of all the available
information. Thus it seems reasonable to assume that
secondary orders, placed perhaps in January for
Easter sales, will use January as the jumping-off spot
for the March forecasts. The same may be for
the last-minute orders placed, say, in February. Were
we to assume that one-third of expected sales in
March are placed at each of the three times (Decem-
ber, January, and February), then the total orders to
correct for errors in forecasts would be a simple aver-
age of change in sales over the previous three months,
two months, and one month, that is:
(Ia)%(S0—S_3) +'/3(S0—S_2) + %(S0—S_1)
Had forecasts been based on the corresponding month
of the previous year, the formula would be:
(Ib)i,i3(s0— + —
+I/3(s0—
The pattern of corrective orders of this sort depends
on the pattern of sales. Toward the close of Chapter 5
we concluded that subcycles in sales may well retard
before peaks or troughs are reached (first differences
in sales lead sales proper). But we could not be sure;
first differences in shoe sales were so erratic that they
needed to be smoothed in order to be studied, and the
smoothing could produce the observed lead (though
there was reason to believe that it did not). But here
the smoothing, by aggregating monthly first differences
of varying term as they are actually observed, is part
and parcel of the process to be described. To see what
corrective orders would look like, we simply have to
compute them. The calculations are based on our
measures of monthly retail shoe sales in pairs (series
33).
Chart 19 shows the result of using formulas Ia and
Ib, where their association with retail sales may be
judged by reference to the vertical grid. Table 34
measures the association with retail sales and some.
other activities. Both hypothetical order series tend to
lead retail sales, often by considerable intervals. The
average timing for matched turns is a lead of around
two months. But the conformity is poor, especially for
the corrective orders based on the previous year.
(Note the small number of matched turns and large
percentage of months in opposite phase.) The series
have a short average lead (the second and third sec-
tions of the table indicate) relative to either wholesale
sales or the Associated Industries of Massachusetts
(AIM) shoe and leather orders series.
The assumptions underlying these calculations of
the error of forecast and consequent correction fail to
take account of several aspects of the ordering pro-
cedure. We noted earlier that errors of forecast made
when long-term orders were placed might be cor-
rected with each order of shorter term rather thanRETAILERS' BUYING—i 107
CHART 19
Hypothetical Corrective Orders under Three Assumptions about the Sales Fore-
cast, 1927—1 941
Speciflc-subcycle peaks and troughs (broken and solid vertical lines)in shoe sales (series 33 in Appendix B),
used as reference frame. For other series, specific.subcycle turns are marked by 0 and retardations by A.
When a specific turn is matched with a turn used as reference turn, a horizontal line or vertical arrow indicates
the association.
See the text for a description of lb and Ila; IIIis a simple average of equations lb,la, and lib.
permitted first to result in unintended change in stocks
and then corrected, as our model assumes. If this is
the case, the importance of cumulated first differences
in sales of longer term would be reduced relative to
those of shorter term. Corrections in any month would
now involve only differences between the current and
the previous month, the rest of the error in previous
orders still outstanding having been corrected month
by month. In consequence, a formula involving piece-
meal correction would differ from formula Ia by the
omission of the weighted sum of second differences
between the previous and each earlier month.25 Ac-
The weights diminish by one with each earlier month and
start at a weight of the number of months in the longest order
term minus one.
tual procedure would probably usually fall somewhere
between the two schemes.
Another clearly unrealistic aspect of the models is
the gearing of both anticipations and corrections to
a rigid single-month criterion; forecasts are not pro-
jections of sales of a single month, but rather of several
months of the recent past. Similarly, a decision to
correct for differences between receipts and sales is
not likely to rest on discrepancies for a single month,
but rather on some sort of cumulation of these for
several months past. By using three months instead of
one in connection, say, with formula Ta, the new pic-
hire of orders to correct for incorrect forecasts is, in
effect, an average of formula Ia over the past three
months. This remark applies only approximately when,108 CHAPTER 8
as in Ib, sales of the previous year are the basis of the
estimates. These series were constructed.
(ha)
%(S_2 +2S_1+ 3S0) —%(S_5 + SS_3)
(hib)
(S_2 +S_1 —
S + + S_H S_12 ±S_18
+ —8 + 2
s_I.,
'-'—13
Timing comparisons for the resultant estimates are
given in Table 34. The average net lead for both of
the two series is a little short of two months—a little
weaker than for the previous calculations.
In an effort to consolidate these several pictures of
underlying tendency for corrective orders of various
shoe retailers, a composite series was constructed and
TABLE 34
is portrayed in Chart 19. Its formula is numbered III
and consists of a simple average of Ib, JIb, and ha.
Double weight is thus given to estimates rooted in the
corresponding month of the previous year, because it
is my impression that most retailers do not readily
make the allowances for usual monthly seasonal pat-
terns necessary to the other type of estimate. Although
most of the time there is not too much difference be-
tween the estimates resulting from the two methods,
the previous-year method will emphasize fluctuation
when, as in late 1938, change in the corresponding,
period of the previous year was strongly in the oppo-
site direction. The contrary is the case, when, as in late
1939, sales bad been changing in the same direction
in the previous year. Table 34 shows that this pres-
entation of composite corrective orders for the trade
as a whole (III) displays, like its components, some
tendency to lead turns in retail sales, shoe production,
and the reference scheme. For none of these computa-
tions is the number of months in unlike phase inter—
Timing Comparisons: Subcycles in Hypothetical Stable Market Orders Compared with Selected Data, 1927—1940
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13 0 7 —2.9 2.8 —2.3 —2
9 2 3 —2.1 2.7 —1.8 —2
11 6 4 —1.7 2.6 —0.7 —1





20 14 8 3 3 —1.9 2.2 —1.5 —2 or —1 43
22 20 7 3 10 —0.7 1.9 0 0 25:
24 19 8 3 8 —1.2 1.8 0 0 30





7 4 2 —1.2 2.2 —0.7 —1
8 3 4 —1.9 2.5 —0.7 —1
40.
40
20 16 8 6 2 —1.3 2.5 —0.5 0 43.
22 17 6 10 1 +0.5 2.0 +0.8 +1 32;
24 16 6 9 1 +0.1 1.9 +0.8 +1 35.








OF ALL MONTHS b
Timing That
NUMBER OF TURNS TIMING (months) Maximizes
Matched Turns C MeanofCorrespondence
Mean AverageCentralLead (—) -
All chro-Lead (—) Devia-3 or 4or Lag (+)
EQUA- HYPOTHETICAL TurnsTotalLeadingLaggingnoneor Lag (+) tion Turns(months)
TXONa OF,DERSERIES (1)(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
3. REFERENCE FRAME: SHOE AND LEATHER ORDERS (23 TImNs) d
Corrective orders based on
sales of:
IaCurrent month 23 18 11 6 1 —1.3 2.4 —1.0 —1 39
lb Year ago 20 20 13 7 0 —1.9 2.6 —1.8 —2 41
III Combined, recent months
and year ago 20 20 10 8 2 —1.2 2.8 —0.3 0 44.
Total stable-market orders:
IVAssuming constant stock
objective 22 18 7 8 3 +0.4 28 +0.2 0 38.
VAssuming incremental
stock-sales ratio of 2 24 22 8 11 3 +0.6 2.7 +0.5 0 40-.
4. REFERENCE FRAME: SHOE PRODUCTION, PMRS (24 TURNS) d
Corrective orders based on
sales of:
III Combined, recent months
and yeax ago 20 16 10 5 1 —1.1 2.5 —1.5 —2 41
Total stable-market orders:
IVAssuming, constant stock
objective 22. 19 9 9 1 —0.4 2.0 —0.8 0
VAssuming incremental
stock-sales ratio of 2 24 19 10 9 0 —0.5 2.1 —0.3 —1 34.
5. REFERENCE FRAME: SLH-SUBCYCLE REFERENCE CHRONOLOGY (21 d
Corrective orders based on
sales of:
III Combined, recent months
and year ago 20 14 10 3 1 —1.9 2.1 —1.8 —2 44.
Total stable-market orders:
IV Assuming constant stock
objective 22 18 10 5 3 —1.1 1.8 —0.8 —1 32
VAssuming incremental
stock-sales ratio of 2 24 18 11 4 3 —1.3 1.8 —1.0 —1 85
a Foran explanation of the equations numbered I and II, see CSeeAppendix A, secs. lOa, b, c, and d.
the text of this chapter. Equation III is a simple average of Ib, d The first four reference frames are series 33, 35, and 40n
ha and hib. Equation IV is total monthly sales plus III; V is in Appendix B. For a description of the SLH-subcycle reference-
sales pius 8 times III (see also Appendix A, sec. I). chronology, see Appendix A, sec. 8.
b See Appendix A, sec. 14.
estingly iow, nor does the logic suggest that it should
be.
This series, too, is certainly a wooden caricature of
the central tendency of correction that retailers make
in their efforts to enforce their inventory objectives.
We have assumed that retailers always make imme-
diate corrections, and often they are doubtless pretty
lax about it—lax, perhaps, about correcting for over-
buying when they are optimistic and for underbuying
when they are pessimistic. We have assumed, further,
that corrections are achieved by adjusting ordets, and'
sometimes prices bear at least part of the burden; I
would expect this to be true of overbuying, especially,,
when wholesale prices have fallen, These factors would
cause the time pattern generated by the strict assump-.
lions of our model to be biased at certain particular-
times or to be too sharp to describe even the central
tendency of reality, which ought to be represented
a fuzzy band.
The assumption that we made as to the nature110 CHAPTER 8
the forecast is the one I consider most realistic; how-
ever, others are permissible and their effect on the
model can be analyzed. This could be done, for ex-
ample, for formal systems of six-month forecasts of
the sort that some stores employ. But since merchan-
dise budgets typically introduce schemes for adjusting
for the difference between actual and expected sales,
this method would principally affect our model in
relation to the preseason order.
Forecasts also have been assumed to incorporate a
rate of change in sales, as well as their current level.2° I
have found no evidence that this is done except when,
as in our model, sales of a previous year are adjusted
for recent change. It seems likely that, at most, the
actual projection of a rate of change may occur at
times when the whole industry is very conscious of
strong change in a given direction. Thus, say, in a time
of general optimism, the projection of December sales
to ascertain Easter requirements, instead of lying along
a horizontal line (positing no change) may lie on an
upward-tilting line, the slope of which represents the
rate of change over recent months. In this case, if the
same slope is adhered to until Easter, then the correc-
tions will be larger than those subsumed in our original
model when sales have not risen but fallen; they will
be of opposite sign when they have risen but by less
than the rate assumed; and they will be smaller but of
like sign when they have risen by more than the as-
sumed rate. We would simply need to adjust our cal-
culations for given monthly increments of change. If,
however, the projected rates of change shift from
month to month, depending on actual experience,
weighted cumulations of graduated duration of second
differences will enter the pattern of correction, but
this, I expect, is most unlikely.
Finally, our assumption of the invariant size ob-
jective of retailers' stocks was arbitrary. If merchants
aim to have stocks change in the same direction as
sales, the amplitude of fluctuation of the corrective
factor will increase. For then orders based on antic-
ipation of sales must not only provide for sales, but
provide also for a parallel increase or decrease in stock.
Errors in guessing future sales will be magnified by the
errors in guessing the amount by which stocks ought
to change; corrections to bring stocks in line with in-
tentions must reverse both errors. The larger the
26LloydMetzler uses a factor of this sort in his "coefficient
ofexpectations" in "Factors Governing the Length of In-
ventory Cycles," Review of Economic Statistics, February 1947.
It also enters as a possible factor in construction cycles in the
discussion by Arthur F. Burns, "Long Cycles in Residential
Construction' in Economic Essays in Honor of Wesley Clair
Mitchell, Columbia University Press, 1935, p. 88, reprinted in
Burns, The Frontiers of Economic Knowledge, Princeton Uni-
versity Press for National Bureau of Economic Research, 1954.
ratio of stocks to sales, or of increments in stocks to
increments in sales, the larger the corrections must be,
other things the same. Thus if stocks are expected to
change as much as sales (an incremental monthly
stock-sales ratio of one), the corrective factor as cal-
culated here should be multiplied by two. If a con-
stant ratio of total stocks to monthly sales is intended,
the incremental stock-sales ratio will have to be the
same as the average one of, say, around three. This
would mean that our calculations would have to be
multiplied by four.
This matter of amplitude of fluctuation of the cor-
rective order is interesting mainly in connection with
the forms in which corrective orders are actually ex-
perienced. Conceptually, they may exist in the pure
state; actually, they exist in some sort of dilution. The
imprint of their characteristic subcycical amplitude
or lead depends on how large a part they play in total
orders of the trade as a whole or in orders received by
various groups of sellers.
Hypothetical Stable Market Orders
It seems probable that the corrective order plays
a far larger part in the sales of some companies or de-
partments than of others. We know that one of the
characteristics of the corrective order is its short de-
livery term and that most shoe wholesalers and the
in-stock departments of shoe manufacturers specialize
in rapid deliveries. Consequently, for these firms to-
tal sales or orders may well be imprinted with the
lead of the corrective order. Several shoe manufac-
turers have said that changes in sales of their in-stock
departments presage changes in total demand, and the
sales of wholesalers are watched by the trade. Insofar
as manufacturers receive these early signals from one
another their importance is greater than the propor-
tion they constitute of aggregate orders for shoes. Their
role in demand transmission may be further magnified
by changes in production schedules and in leather
buying based on them.
Nevertheless, the proportion that corrective orders
constitute of the industry-wide total of all orders for
shoes is also important, and it will be heavily in-
fluenced by what the stock size objective actually is.
The character of the relationship has been discussed;
how it may operate is illustrated by two hypothetical
total stable market orders series calculated on the
basis of two alternative assumptions as to distributors'
size objectives concerning stock. The first, IV, assumes
that stocks are intended to remain invariant (an incre-
mental stock-sales ratio of zero), and the second, V,
that the incremental stock-sales ratio is two—consider-ably lower than would be necessary to keep the aver-
age stock-sales ratio constant. Regular orders—those
aiming to provide for expected sales and desired
change in stocks—are assumed to be identical to cur-
rent sales at the time they are placed. Consequently,
the best estimate of corrective orders (formula III) is
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addedto current sales for the first estimate (IV) and
the same series is multiplied by three for the second
one (V). The data are exhibited in Chart 20 along
with several series with which it may be interesting to
compare them.
The chart shows how the relatively temperate activ-
CHART 20
Hypothetical Total Stable Market Orders under Two Assumptions about Future
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ity of retail sales can, by the judicious pursuit of sen-
sible and conservative business policy, acquire the ex-
cited look of an order series. In addition to this
greater subcyclical amplitude, the constructs appear
to have a slight tendency to lead sales. Both the chart
and Table 34 show that the hypothetical order series
often turn at the same time as retail sales; however
they lead, over twice as often as they lag. The leads
are clear, Chart 20 indicates (with the exception of one
turn for series IV), at all four of the major turns.
The hypothetical series project (under stable market
conditions) the implications of objectives and proce-
dures of retailers' purchasing which we believe to be
typical. One would wish to test this construction with
the aid of some independent set of observations. But
not only do we have no information about retailers' or-
dering under stable market conditions; we have no
reliable information about ordering at all. Neverthe-
less, realizing both the conceptual and statistical im-
proprieties, it is interesting to compare the two series
of hypothetical stable market orders with the two
stand-ins for orders that have been used before.
We have already noted how Chart 20 indicates that
the arithmetic transpositions of retail sales implied by
the calculations have carried the construct in the di-
rection of the independent statistics of orders. Table
34 shows that both hypothetical order series are ap-
proximately synchronous, on the average, with whole-
sale sales and with shoe and leather orders. However,
the percentage of months in different phase is not
small. But from Chart 20, one gains the impression that
the measures miss quite a bit of the resemblances be-
tween the construct and wholesale sales or even the
AIM shoe and leather orders.
The usual measures of subcycical and selected cycle
amplitudes are given in Table 35. They may help to
indicate which of the two series embodies the most
realistic assumption about the stock objective, since
the character of the assumption has a strong influence
on the amplitude of fluctuation of the series. We see
there what the charts have already taught: both of the
hypothetical order series have a notably higher ampli-
tude than retail sales. Wholesale sales, on the other
hand, the only data that can be used as an independent
representation of orders in this context,27 fall between
the two series. Because the inclusion of shifts in market
Shoe and leather orders are disqualified because the am-
plitude of fluctuation for leather buying may be quite a bit
larger than for shoe buying and also because some of the
figures are reported in dollars rather than pairs, which like-
wise would overstate the amplitude.
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position would add still further to the subcyclical
amplitude of shoe orders, I read these figures as sug-
gesting that the incremental stock-sales ratio of two
is high; a ratio of one seems more realistic. This is
the ratio suggested by the seasonal figures. It would
yield a subcyclical amplitude for hypothetical orders
falling between the two as computed; it would be
greater than for retail sales (and greater by a larger
amount per month for subcycles than for major cycles),
less than for wholesale sales, and about the same as for
shoe production (for which some smoothing of the
pattern of ordering is always achieved).
The average amplitudes for all fluctuations hide
an interesting fact: The relationship between our hypo-
thetical stable market order series and wholesale sales
is different for various movements common to both
series. The eye can pick up some of these differences
in Chart 20. Note, for example, the steeper fall in
wholesale sales in late 1929 and 1930, or the sharper
rise as 1936 ran its course, or the heavier drop toward
the close of the following year. To explain these
episodes, we must abandon the assumption of stable
market conditions and learn how shifting market pros-
pects affect buying.
TABLE 35
Amplitude of Fluctuation in Shoe Retailers' Hypothetical Stable
Market Orders and in Related Activities, 1926—1940
a Eachfall from peak to trough is added to each rise from
trough to peak, the sum for all phases is divided by the number
of months covered, and expressed as a percentage of the average
value of the series (see Appendix A, sec. 16). The period covered
is never longer than January 1926 to December 1940, but may
be shorter, depending on when the initial trough and terminal
peak is selected.
b Amplitudes for specific cycles that are defined by those
specific-cycle turns associated with SLH-cycle reference turns.
An incomplete initial expansion and a terminal one are included;
for these phases, the bounding initial and terminal turns, respec-
tively, are selected as that specific-subcycle trough not earlier
than January 1926 or peak not later than December 1940 that
maximizes the total amplitude of each of these two incomplete
cycle phases.